College of the Holy Cross

CrossWorks
Economics Department Working Papers

Economics Department

7-1-2009

Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and
Bargaining
Bryan Engelhardt
College of the Holy Cross, bengelha@holycross.edu

David L. Fuller

Follow this and additional works at: http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Engelhardt, Bryan and Fuller, David L., "Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining" (2009). Economics
Department Working Papers. Paper 34.
http://crossworks.holycross.edu/econ_working_papers/34

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Department at CrossWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Papers by an authorized administrator of CrossWorks.

Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining
By
Bryan Engelhardt
and
David L. Fuller

Originally published: July 2009
Revised: November 2009

COLLEGE OF THE HOLY CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
FACULTY RESEARCH SERIES, PAPER NO. 09-09*

Department of Economics
College of the Holy Cross
Box 45A
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610
(508) 793-3362 (phone)
(508) 793-3708 (fax)
http://www.holycross.edu/departments/economics/website

*

All papers in the Holy Cross Working Paper Series should be considered draft versions subject
to future revision. Comments and suggestions are welcome.

Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining
By
Bryan Englehardt†
College of the Holy Cross
and
David L. Fuller††
Concordia University

Originally Published: July 2009
Revised: November 2009

Abstract
A fixed wage is inefficient in a standard search model when workers endogenously
separate from employment. We derive an efficient employment contract that involves agents
paying a hiring fee (or bond) upon the formation of a match. We estimate the fixed wage and
efficient contract assuming the hiring fee is unobservable, and find evidence to reject the efficient
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Introduction
Transitions in and out of the labor force represent an important component of labor market

activity. The movement of agents from employment to non-participation represents one example
of these transitions. For the U.S. economy, these transitions are significant and vary across the
wage distribution, with those at the lower end exiting at a faster rate than those at the higher
end. Despite the importance of these flows for labor market outcomes, the literature studying
equilibrium labor markets has devoted little attention to labor market participation decisions, and
even less to the transition from employment to non-participation. Recent work in this area, while
limited, has developed along two dimensions: one attempting to develop models to explain the
transitions into and out of non-participation, and another that includes these transitions in policy
experiments, allowing researchers to determine the effect of policies on the composition of the
labor force.
We develop a model that contributes to the literature on both fronts. First, our model is capable
of explaining how the transition from employment to non-participation changes over the wage
distribution, a feature that remains relatively unexplored. Second, we find that when building a
model to explain these flows, the policy implications remain unclear. Specifically, our analysis
characterizes a potentially large negative externality arising from the endogenous transition from
employment to non-participation. After recognizing the potential inefficiency, we determine if U.S.
data remains consistent with employment contracts that internalize the externality, or with standard
employment contracts that do not. Thus, the outcome of our analysis has important implications for
the efficacy of labor market policies, especially those directed towards altering the composition of
the labor force. In other words, we ask the question: Is the current level of labor force participation
optimal? If the answer is no, then what are the potential welfare gains from achieving the optimal
participation rate?
To capture the large transitions between labor market states, we develop a search and matching
model with two important features. First, we extend the standard Pissarides (2000) model to include an endogenous labor force participation decision where agents receive idiosyncratic shocks
affecting the value of non-market activities. Second, we include match specific productivity, resulting in a distribution of wages, transition rates that vary conditional on the wage, and thus transition
rates depending on the employment contract determining the wage.
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Modeling the decision to exit employment, however, introduces theoretical complications.
Specifically, when agents take actions affecting the duration of the match, the nature of the employment contract affects the efficiency properties of the models’ equilibria. In exploring this fact, we
demonstrate what an efficient employment contract looks like, and show that the standard surplus
splitting rule is not efficient.
The endogenous transition from employment to non-participation implies inefficiency because
it introduces a negative externality. In our model, while employed in a productive match, agents
receive opportunities for non-market activities. In some periods, the value of accepting these
opportunities exceeds the value of retaining the match, and as a result, an agent may decide to
quit and leave the labor force. The externality arises because agents fail to internalize the cost the
separation imposes on their firm (who payed a fixed cost to post the vacancy and hire the worker).
When the employment contract consists of only a fixed wage, determined by a surplus splitting
rule, the aforementioned externality obtains; therefore, any equilibria produced by the model fail
to be efficient. This occurs because ameliorating the externality requires firms to pay a wage equal
to the productivity of the match. Of course, when the employment contract consists of only a fixed
wage, no active equilibrium retains this feature. We derive an alternative employment contract,
and demonstrate it is efficient. It specifies agents receive a wage equal to the productivity of the
match and pay a “hiring fee” to the firm upon the formation of the match. The introduction of the
hiring fee allows the externality to be internalized and efficiency is achieved.
In this paper, we focus on determining if the efficient contract or the fixed wage rule is more
consistent with U.S. data. To make this comparison, we estimate both models using wage and
duration data, assuming the hiring fee is unobservable. From the estimates, we compare the fit
of the two models. While we do not observe an actual hiring fee (or other features of wage contracts resembling one, e.g. wage-tenure contracts) in the data, the two models do predict different
combinations of wages and durations. Thus, despite not explicitly observing a hiring fee, observed
wages and durations could be consistent with the model featuring such wage contracts. The idea is
to determine whether the observed wages and durations are more consistent with the implications
of the efficient contract or the inefficient fixed wage rule.
Using NLSY data, we estimate both models using maximum likelihood estimation. We find
that under certain parametric restrictions, the likelihood function that incorporates the efficient
contract is nested within the likelihood function that features the inefficient fixed wage rule. Given
3

this fact, we are then able to perform a formal specification test to determine which contract best
describes the U.S. data. The results indicate that the model with an inefficient fixed wage rule
provides a better fit than the model with the efficient contract.
Given evidence of an inefficient contract, we then quantify its consequences. Specifically, we
perform a counterfactual exercise to determine the welfare gains of a structural shift from the inefficient to the efficient contract. We find labor force participation would rise by 9%, employment by
17%, and unemployment would fall 11%. Overall, the adoption of the efficient contract increases
welfare by 3.75%.
This paper contributes to several strands of the labor literature, and in particular the research on
search.1 First, several authors (for example Stevens (2004), Shimer (2005), and Bonilla & Burdett
(2005)) show that if workers take actions affecting the duration of the match, then inefficiencies
can arise depending on the nature of the employment contract. A few authors have also attempted
to incorporate a labor market decision into search models. Garibaldi & Wasmer (2005) develop a
search model with stochastic participation costs to analyze the labor force participation decision.
In their model however, the wage distribution remains degenerate; as a result, it is unable to capture
the flow of employed workers to non-participation across the wage distribution. Pries & Rogerson
(2004) also develop a search model with matching frictions to study labor force participation decisions. Their model focuses on the dynamic nature of participation decisions, and qualitatively captures the correlation between participation rates and participation flows. Our model extends their
analysis along two dimensions. First we perform a general equilibrium analysis, allowing for job
creation decisions by firms. Second, we allow for a continuous distribution of idiosyncratic shocks
to the relative value of non-participation. Pries & Rogerson (2004) use a two-shock case, which
does not capture the variation in exit rates across the wage distribution. Finally, our work is also
related to Yip (2003), who develops and estimates a search model with endogenous labor force
participation decisions, driven by idiosyncratic shocks to the relative value of non-participation.
Yip (2003) performs some counterfactual policy experiments, but does not derive Pareto optimal
allocations. The counterfactual exercises in Yip (2003) focus on how changes in policy variables
(such as unemployment benefits) affect the composition of the labor market as well as welfare. In
contrast, we focus first on determining which employment contract best describes the data, and our
1 The literature on search models of the labor market is extensive; consequently, we only discuss those papers most
closely related to ours.

4

counterfactual exercise calculates the gains from achieving efficiency.
This work also contributes to the literature investigating the role of various labor market policies. Flinn (2006) represents one recent example of this discussion. Flinn analyzes the role of
minimum wage policies in a search model with matching frictions similar to the one we use here.
The focus of his analysis rests on determining whether the Hosios condition (Hosios (1990)) holds
when the parameters are estimated using U.S. data. When the resulting parameters do not satisfy
the aforementioned condition, the paper suggests there may exist a role for minimum wage policies
in improving welfare. In contrast, our analysis abstracts from inefficiencies arising from parametric
restrictions, focusing instead on structural inefficiencies. Flinn & Mabli (2008) represents another
example studying the effects of minimum wage policies in a similar model with on-the-job search.
This work is similar to ours in that the specific employment contract affects the welfare properties
of equilibria.
Finally, the paper contributes to the efficiency wage literature (Carmichael (1990) contains
a critical survey). For instance, we find firms pay higher wages due to job turnover. However,
we do not find efficiency wages because of a strict assumption about the job turnover to wage
relationship.2 Rather, we deduce higher wages due to the increased bargaining position of the
worker. More importantly, we contribute to the bonding critique. The efficient contract we study
involves agents paying a “hiring” fee upon the formation of the match; this represents a similar
concept to the “bonding” approach used in the efficiency wage literature. Much of that literature
has assumed bonds do not exist and argued for theoretical reasons why this might be true. In
contrast, we assume the bonds are unobservable and test for their presence.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the environment. Section
3 describes the agent and firm decision problems, and Section 4 characterizes the resulting equilibrium. Section 5 outlines the data, the estimation procedure, and discusses the results. Finally,
Section 6 discusses the counterfactual welfare exercises and Section 7 concludes.
2 This

could be assumed and would result in even higher wages.
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2

Model

2.1

The Environment

The economy consists of a unit-measure of infinitely-lived agents and a large measure of firms.
Time, t, is continuous and goes on forever. Each agent has an endowment of one indivisible unit
of time with three alternative, mutually exclusive uses: search for a job, work for a firm, or do
not participate in the formal labor market.3 Agents and firms are risk-neutral and discount at rate
r > 0.
An unemployed agent searching for a job enjoys utility flow b, interpreted as the utility from
not working. Upon receiving a job offer when unemployed, agents and firms observe a match
specific productivity, y, drawn from a distribution F(y) with support [0, ȳ], and decide whether to
accept or reject the match. Firms are composed of a single job, either filled or vacant, and discount
future profits at rate r. Vacant firms are free to enter and pay a flow cost, γ > 0, to advertise a
vacancy. Vacant firms produce no output and filled firms produce one final good.
The labor market is subject to search-matching frictions. The aggregate matching function,
ζ (U,V ), describes the flow of job offers, where U represents the measure of unemployed workers
actively looking for jobs, and V the measure of vacant jobs. The matching function, ζ , is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave (with respect to each of its arguments), and exhibits
constant returns to scale. Furthermore, ζ (0, ·) = ζ (·, 0) = 0 and ζ (∞, ·) = ζ (·, ∞) = ∞. Following
Pissarides’ terminology, define θ ≡ V /U, referred to as labor market “tightness.” Each vacancy is
filled according to a Poisson process with arrival rate

ζ (U,V )
V

≡ q(θ ). Similarly, each unemployed

worker finds a job according to a Poisson process with arrival rate

ζ (U,V )
U

= θ q(θ ). Filled jobs

receive negative idiosyncratic productivity shocks rendering the match unprofitable with a Poisson
arrival rate s. Denote by ne (y), nu , and no the measure of workers employed with productivity y,
unemployed, and not in the labor force, respectively.
The existence of opportunities to exit the labor force represents the distinguishing feature of
our model. Employed and unemployed agents receive opportunities to exit the labor force at rates
λe and λu , respectively. Upon receiving an opportunity, the agent observes the instantaneous payoff
ε, drawn from a distribution G(ε) on the support [0, ε]. If the agent takes the opportunity, then the
agent enjoys the instantaneous utility ε and exits the labor market. When outside the labor force,
3 Non-participation

can include a range of activities, including home-production, leisure, etc.
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they enjoy a utility flow x and re-enter the labor market at an exogenous rate δ .

3

Bellman equations
Agent and firm decisions depend, among other factors, on the wage paid to workers. To de-

termine wages for each match, we assume agents and firms bargain over their joint surplus. We
consider two different types of contracts. The first contract specifies that upon the formation of
a match, the worker pays a hiring fee, φ , and then receives a constant wage, w, thereafter. We
establish below that this type of contract is Pareto-optimal, and thus refer to it as the “efficient
contract.” Alternatively, we consider an employment contract featuring only a wage determined by
an exogenous surplus splitting rule, similar to the one used in Pissarides (2000). In either case, w,
or the pair (φ , w), are determined through a bargaining solution.4 This section begins with the case
of the efficient contract. We focus on steady-state equilibria, where market tightness, θ , matching
probabilities, and exit rates remain constant over time. In the next two subsections, we describe
the flow Bellman equations for agents and firms, and characterize the employment contracts.

3.1

Agents

Denote the value of being an agent in state i ∈ {u, e, o} by Vu , Vo and Ve (y), respectively. An
agent in state i = u is considered unemployed, i = e employed, and i = o not in the labor force
(non-participation). The flow Bellman equations for individuals’ value functions follow

Z

rVu = b + θ q(θ )

+

[Ve (y) − Vu − φ (y)] dF(y) + λu

rVe (y) = w(y) + s (Vu − Ve (y)) + λe

Z

Z

[ε + Vo − Vu ]+ dG(ε)

[ε + Vo − Ve (y)]+ dG(ε)

rVo = x + δ (Vu − Vo )

(1)
(2)
(3)

where [z]+ = max(z, 0). Equation (1) has the following interpretation. An unemployed worker
enjoys a utility flow of b defined as the utility from not working. She finds a job with an instantaneous probability θ q(θ ). Each job has a match specific productivity, y, drawn from the distribution
4 Implicit

in this formulation is the firm commits to the terms of the employment contract. In particular, once the
worker pays the hiring fee the firm does not renege on the promised future wage.
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F(y). Upon formation of the match, the agent pays a hiring fee, φ (y), and enjoys a surplus gain
Ve (y) − Vu . When unemployed, the agent receives an opportunity to exit the labor force with instantaneous probability λu . If a worker chooses to exit, then the agent enjoys flow utility ε, drawn
from the distribution G(ε), and gains the capital Vo − Vu . From (2), an employed worker receives
a wage w, loses the job with an instantaneous probability s, and has the opportunity to exit the
labor force with an instantaneous probability λe . According to (3), an agent outside the labor force
receives flow utility x, and enters unemployment with an instantaneous probability δ .
An agent accepts a job offer if w ≥ w(yR ), where yR defines the point where workers remain
indifferent between becoming employed or remaining unemployed, which satisfies
Ve (yR ) = Vu .

(4)

From (1) and (2) an individual in state i chooses to exit the labor market whenever ε ≥ εi where
εu = Vu − Vo ,

(5)

εe (y) = Ve (y) − Vo ,

(6)

From (5)-(6) the value of the opportunity that makes an individual in a given state indifferent
between exiting or not, εi , is equal to the expected cost of leaving, Vi (y) − V0 . Subtracting (5) from
(6), we have
Ve (y) − Vu = εe (y) − εu

3.2

(7)

Firms

Firms participating in the market can be in one of two states: they either hold a vacant job (v)
or a filled job ( f ). The following summarize firms’ flow Bellman equations.

Z


φ (y) + V f (y) − Vv dF(y)
yR

rV f (y) = y − w(y) − s V f (y) − Vv − λe [1 − G(εe )] (V f (y) − Vv )
rVv = −γ + q(θ )

(8)
(9)

According to (8), a vacancy incurs an advertising cost γ; the firm finds an unemployed worker with
an instantaneous probability q(θ ) in which case it receives a hiring fee φ (y) and enjoys a surplus
8

gain V f (y) − Vv . According to (9), a filled job enjoys flow profit y − w(y) and is destroyed when a
negative idiosyncratic productivity shock occurs with instantaneous probability s, or if the worker
exits, an event occurring with instantaneous probability λe [1 − G(εe )]. Free-entry of firms implies
Vv = 0 and therefore, from (8),
Z
yR


φ (y) + V f (y) dF(y) =

γ
.
q(θ )

(10)

From (10), the firms’ surplus from a match (the sum of the expected value of a filled job and the
expected value of the hiring fee) equals the average recruiting cost incurred by the firm. Note, if
λe = λu = 0 and F(y) remains degenerate, the model is exactly Pissarides (2000).

3.3

Employment contract with a hiring fee

We now discuss in more detail the employment contract specified thus far, and explore its
efficiency properties. To determine the details of the pair-wise efficient employment contract, we
define S (y) ≡ Ve (y) − Vu + V f (y), which represents the total surplus of a match (recall Vv = 0).
From (2) and (9),
rS (y) = y − rVu − sS (y) + λe

Z ε̄

[ε − S − (Vu − Vo )] dG(ε)

(11)

εe

Equation (11) has the following interpretation. A match generates a flow surplus, y − rVu , composed of the output of the job and the permanent income of an unemployed person, rVu . The match
is destroyed if either an exogenous shock occurs (at Poisson rate s), or if the worker chooses to
separate. In the latter case, the value S of the match is lost and the worker exits the labor force,
which generates an additional capital loss Vu − Vo . The value of the match also incorporates the
value of the outside option undertaken by the employed worker.
We assume a worker and a firm can jointly determine the exit opportunities undertaken by the
worker. It can be seen from (11), that the surplus of the match is maximized if

εe (y) = (S (y) + Vu − Vo ) = Ve (y) + V f (y) − Vo .

(12)

Comparison of (6) and (12) reveals that if V f > 0, the worker’s choice of which outside opportunities to accept and the choice that maximizes the match surplus differ; i.e. the total surplus of
the match is not maximized. Employed workers separate “too frequently” because they do not
9

internalize the negative externality they impose on the firm.5
We show that by allowing the employment contract to include the upfront fee, φ (y), the worker
and the firm can reach a pairwise-efficient outcome. The employment contract (φ , w) is determined by the generalized Nash solution, where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the worker’s bargaining power.
Specifically, the contract satisfies
1−β
(φ , w) = arg max (Ve (y) − Vu − φ (y))β V f (y) − Vv + φ (y)
,

(13)

The following Lemma describes the properties of the Pareto optimal, or efficient employment
contract.
Lemma 1 The pair-wise efficient contract is
w(y) = y,

(14)

φ (y) = (1 − β ) (Ve (y) − Vu ) .

(15)

Proof. See Appendix A
According to Lemma 1, the pair-wise efficient contract sets the wage equal to the worker’s
productivity.6 Since the worker gets the entire output generated by the match, V f = 0, and the
worker internalizes the effect of her exit decision on the total surplus of the match. The up-front
payment splits the surplus of the match according to each agent’s bargaining power.7 To fully
describe the equilibrium in the next section, it is useful to write the first order condition of (13)
with respect to φ (y):
(1 − β )[Ve (y) − Vu − φ (y)] = β [V f (y) + φ (y)]

(16)

In modeling the decision to leave the labor force, we have assumed agents receive idiosyncratic
“shocks” which produce instantaneous flow utility before exiting the current state. Once they
enter non-participation, Vo remains constant. Alternatively, one could assume the value of nonparticipation, Vo remains stochastic; i.e. the idiosyncratic shocks affect Vo directly. In this case,
5 See

Engelhardt, Rocheteau & Rupert (2008) for more discussion of this externality.
the firm makes no profit after the hiring fee has been paid, it has no incentive to fire the worker as the value
of a vacancy is no greater than the value of a filled job, i.e., V f (y) = Vv = 0.
7 Alternatively, the optimal contract could take the form of a constant wage, w(y), and a payment from the worker
to the firm (a fine) if the worker exits. This transfer would exactly compensate the firm for its lost surplus, and is
equivalent to the current contract.
6 Since
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the Bellman equation for non-participation becomes
rVo (ε) = ε + δ (Vu − Vo )
We use the stochastic flow value approach because it provides analytic convenience, allowing us
to use integration by parts and write the equilibrium conditions cleanly. However, either structure
leads to the same efficiency results discussed in Lemma 1; the optimal contract must include a
hiring fee. Given this equivalence, we chose the analytically transparent approach as it plays a
central role when comparing the two models.

3.4

Fixed wage employment contract

We now consider the case of a fixed (or exogenous) wage. In this case, φ (y) = 0, ∀y (i.e. the
employment contract consists of only the wage), and the wage is determined using the following
surplus splitting rule:

(1 − β ) [Ve (y) − Vu ] = β V f (y) ,

(17)

which corresponds to the standard search and bargaining surplus splitting wage equation, as discussed in Pissarides (2000). Using (7), (17), and
V f (y) =

y − w(y)
r + s + λe [1 − G(εe (y))]

(18)

we can write the wage in this case as

w(y) = y −

1−β
(r + s + λe [1 − G(εe (y))]) (εe (y) − εu )
β

(19)

Note, since β ∈ (0, 1), y > w(y) and from (18) V f (y) > 0, efficiency is not achieved in this model.8

4

Equilibrium
This section characterizes the equilibrium for the aforementioned economy. To facilitate the

presentation of both models simultaneously, we introduce an indicator function, χ, where χ = 1
8 Again,

note if λe = 0, w(y) follows exactly from Pissarides (2000).
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when the employment contract includes the hiring fee, φ (y), and χ = 0 for the fixed wage case.
The idea is to show the equilibrium can be represented by three equations in three unknowns,
εe (y), εu , and θ . Towards this end, the free entry condition implies
γ
=
q(θ )

Z


V f (y) + χφ (y) dF(Y ).

yR

(20)

Using (7) and (16) for the efficient contract case, and (7) and (17) for the fixed wage contract case,
to solve for V f (y), substituting into (20) gives
(1 − β )
γ
=
q(θ )
β

Z
yR


(εe (y) − εu − χφ (y)) dF(Y ) .

(21)

This represents the first relationship between εe (y), εu , and θ . Then, combining (1), (3), (5) and
(20), and integrating by parts, we have

(r + δ )εu = b − x +

β γθ
+ λu
(1 − β )

Z

[1 − G(ε)] dε

(22)

εu

This provides the second relationship between εe (y), εu , and θ . Similarly, for y ≥ yR , using (2) and
(6), and integration by parts, we have

rεe (y) + δ εu + x = χy + (1 − χ)w(y) + s(εu − εe ) + λe

Z

[1 − G(ε)] dε,

(23)

εe (y)

where for χ = 0, w(y) follows (19). Equations (22) and (23) determine the values of εu and εe (y)
as functions of θ . These can then be substituted into (21) to determine θ .
To complete the description of equilibrium, consider the steady state distribution of agents
across states, (ne (y), nu , no ), where ni denotes the number of agents in state i ∈ {u, e, o}. This
distribution is characterized by the following three equations.

Z

s
yR

ne (y)dF(y) + no δ = {θ q(θ ) [1 − F(yR )] + λ [1 − G(εu )]} nu

θ q(θ ) [1 − F(yR )] f (y|y ≥ yR )nu = (λ [1 − G(εe (y))] + s) ne (y), ∀y ∈ [yR , ȳ]

(24)
(25)

Z
yR

ne (y)dF(y) + nu + no = 1

(26)

According to (24) the flows into and out of unemployment must be equal. The measure of agents
entering unemployment is the sum of the employed workers who lose their jobs, sne , and the
12

non-participants who enter the labor market, δ no . The flow of agents exiting unemployment corresponds to those finding jobs, θ q(θ )[1 − F(yR )]nu , or unemployed agents exiting the labor market,
λu [1 − G(εu )]nu . Similarly, (25) prescribes that the flows into and out of employment must be
equal in the steady state for all y ∈ [yR , ȳ]. Equation (26) constrains agents to be either employed,
unemployed, or out of the labor force. Figure 1 depicts the flows.
Figure 1: Worker Flows

We can now define an equilibrium for the model.
Definition 1 A steady state equilibrium is a list, {θ , εu , εe (y), ne (y), nu , no }, such that θ , εu , and
εe (y) solve (21), (22), and (23); and ne (y), nu , no solve (24)-(26).

Determining an equilibrium represents a fixed point problem in θ . Specifically, for an initial
value of θ , (22) and (23) determine values for εu and εe (y). Given these values, (21) determines
a new value of θ . This process continues until (21) holds. In general, a unique equilibrium may
not exist without further restrictions on the parameter space, or the functional forms of G, F and
q. However, Engelhardt et al. (2008) show an equilibrium exists and is unique under the efficient
contract given F is degenerate. Alternatively, an equilibrium can be shown to exist with a nondegenerate distribution F given certain conditions on λu and λe . In the simulations run below, we
find an equilibrium exists and appears to be unique.
13

To this point, we have described two models, each of which makes predictions about labor market behavior and outcomes. Given the specified employment contract, each model has equilibrium
flows into and out of the various labor market states, as well as the steady state levels of employment and labor market participation. The question we now pursue is which model best describes
the behavior observed in the U.S. labor market? To perform this comparison, we estimate each
model, and compare their respective predictions with observed behavior.

5

Estimation
We use Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to identify the parameters for each model

specification. In this section we describe the data, derive the likelihood function, discuss identification, and provide the estimates of the two models’ parameters. With these estimates, we then
perform a likelihood ratio test to determine which model remains more appropriate for describing
the observed behavior.

5.1

Data

The data comes from the National Longitudinal Survey 1997 (NLSY97), a panel data set of
individuals in the U.S. between the ages of 12 and 16 in 1997. The NLSY97 observes when an
individual is employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force, in addition to an individual’s wage
if employed. We estimate each model from the duration and wage data.
We start the sample on January 1, 2002; as a result, the individuals we observe are at least
seventeen years of age. We also limit the sample to individuals who have exited school with less
than a college degree.9 We adopt a stock sampling approach. Specifically, we record what state
an individual is initially in at a particular point in time, we then record the duration of time spent
in the original state (unemployed, employed or out of the labor force), where the time spent is ti
for i = {e, u, o}. After a span of time, an individual transitions from the original state “i” to the
new state “ j.” Denote by Ni, j = 1 the number of agents who have transitioned from state i to state
j and zero otherwise, where i, j ∈ {e, u, o}.10 Finally, the wage we is observed for those whom
9 We

follow Wolpin (1987), Bowlus, Kiefer & Neumann (1995) and others in determining who should be included
in the sample.
10 If we observe an agent transition from employment to employment, we assume they spend a short time, less than
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are initially employed as well as the wage wu for those whom transition from unemployment to
employment (wages are recorded as the hourly wage). Table 5.1 contains the descriptive statistics.
Figure 2 presents the duration data graphically. The wage data are presented graphically in Section
5.5 when we compare the fit of the efficient and inefficient contracts against the observed data.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Transitions from u to o (Nu,o )
0.043
0.202
Transitions from u to e (Nu,e )
0.055
0.229
Transitions from o to u (No,u )
0.31
0.463
Transitions from e to u (Ne,u )
0.321
0.467
Transitions from e to o (Ne,o )
0.259
0.438
Duration Unemployed (tu )
1.363
1.644
Duration Outside Labor Force (to ) 2.537
3.625
Duration Employed (te )
3.872
4.459
Wage if initially employed (we )
8.858
4.147
Wage if inititally unemployed (wu ) 8.542
4.431
Observations
3593
Note: Durations are quarterly and wage statistics are hourly.
Transitions do not sum to one due to right censoring and the
wage distribution is trimmed at 2.5% level. Missing wage
and duration data is assumed to occur randomly and are excluded.

Figure 2: Duration of Employment, Unemployment, and Outside the Labor Force

the interval of measure, unemployed. In addition, if we observe an agent transition from out of the labor force to
employment, we assume they are unemployed for a period of time less than the frequency of the data, which is a week.
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5.2

Likelihood Function, fixed wage employment contract

We begin by presenting the estimation of the fixed wage employment contract. The likelihood
function consists of three multiplicative components derived from those we initially observe to be
employed, unemployed, or not participating. In constructing the likelihood function, each component includes the length of time individuals spend in the initial state. Once individuals transition,
we observe and use the information on where they transitioned. For those employed at some point
during the sample, we observe and incorporate their wage into the likelihood function.
Non-participants represent a straightforward component of the likelihood function. In particular, individuals transition according to a Poisson process with rate δ . As a result, an agent’s
duration of time outside the labor force has an exponential distribution. Refer to Chapter 5 in
Lancaster (1990) for the derivation of the probability distribution from stock sampling. Given this,
non-participants contribute to the likelihood function as
P(No,u ,to ) = no δ e−δto ,
where no is the probability of being outside the labor force and is a function of the Poisson arrival
rates as described in the flow equations (24)-(26).
The unemployed contribute to the likelihood function in three ways. Given they are initially
unemployed with probability nu , their duration of unemployment factors in as
fu (tu |u) = {hu + ku }e−{hu +ku }tu ,
where hu = θ q(θ )[1 − F(yR )] and ku = λu [1 − G(εu )]. Second, they contribute the probability of
transitioning to employment or non-participation as
hu
,
hu + ku
ku
P(Nu,o |u) =
.
hu + ku
P(Nu,e |u) =

Finally, if they transition to employment, then they draw a match specific productivity and in
turn wage according to

fw (wu |Nu,e ) =

∂ y(wu ) f (y(wu ))
.
∂ wu 1 − F(yR )
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where the productivity of the match, y(wu ), is derived from (19). The unemployed’s complete
contribution to the likelihood function is
P(tu , Nu,e , Nu,o , wu ) = nu fu (tu |u)P(Nu,o |u)Nu,o [P(Nu,e |u) fw (wu |Nu,e )]Nu,e .
The employed contribute to the likelihood function in two ways. Given they are initially employed and paid we with probability ne (y(we )), their duration of employment enters as
fe (te |e, we ) = {s + ke (y(we ))}e−{s+ke (y(we ))}te ,
where ke (y(we )) = λe [1 − G(εe (y(we )))]. Second, their probability of transitioning to unemployment or out of the labor force is

P(Ne,u |e, we ) =

s
,
s + ke (y(we ))

P(Ne,o |e, we ) =

ke (y(we ))
.
s + ke (y(we ))

As a result, the complete contribution of the employed is
P(te , Ne,u , Ne,o , we ) = ne (y(we )) fe (te |e, we )P(Ne,u |e, we )Ne,u P(Ne,o |e, we )Ne,o ,
The complete likelihood function can thus be written as11

lnL = ∑ log(P(No,u ,to )) + ∑ log(P(tu , Nu,e , Nu,o , wu )) + ∑ log(P(te , Ne,u , Ne,o , we ))
i∈o

i∈u

(27)

i∈e

Since the distributions G(ε) and F(y) will take on an assumed parametric form, they can be characterized by the parameter vectors τg and τ f , respectively.

5.3

Identification, fixed wage contract

This section describes identification of the fixed wage contract case. Identification of the efficient contract is similar and described in the next section.
The likelihood function in (27) leaves the following parameters to be determined: δ , s, λu ,
11 Note,

although not described in (27), right censoring has been accounted for in the usual manner.
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λe , r, b, x, γ, β , τg , τ f , and the parameters of the matching function. Ignoring the parameters
that determine no , nu , and ne (y), identification of δ , s, hu and ku follows directly from the first
order conditions of the likelihood function. More specifically, the simple exponential form for the
duration data implies

No,u
,
∑i∈o ti
Ne,u
s =
,
∑i∈o ti
Nu,o
ku =
,
∑i∈o ti
Nu,e
.
hu =
∑i∈o ti
δ =

Although ku and hu are not parameters of interest, they are used to deduce λu and the parameters of
the matching function, which we discuss in more detail below. Estimating no , nu , and ne (y) directly
is a simple multinomial problem. More robust estimates are provided, however, by substituting in
the steady state probability of being in each state, as defined by the flow equations. We take the
latter approach.
We take a reduced-form approach to estimating ke (y(we )) (which we use to infer λe ), fitting it
according to κ1 exp(κ2 w). Specifically, we plug k̂e (w) = κ1 exp(κ2 w) into (27) and maximize the
likelihood with respect to κ1 and κ2 . Note, if we find κ2 > 0, then individuals exit at a faster rate
the more they earn. Alternatively, if κ2 < 0, then the more individuals earn the less likely they are
to exit their job. This approach is similar to Bontemps, Robin & van den Berg (2000) where they
use a non-parametric procedure to estimate the wage distribution, which they then use to deduce
other parameters from the model. We have also tried a nonparametric procedure, where we use a
constant rate of exit, ke (w) = κi , for different intervals of the wage distribution, w ∈ [wi , wi+1 ), and
found similar results to our reduced-form approach. Comparison of the model’s exit rates and the
reduced-form estimates are provided in Figure 4 below.
We use the wage distribution to identify the parameter vector τ f . In doing so, a complication arises as y(wu ) and y(we ) are functions of the difference εe (y) − εe (yR ) as seen in (19). To
circumvent this difficulty, we assume the distribution of outside opportunities is exponential, so
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G(ε) = 1 − exp(− µ1g ε). Under this parametric assumption, the difference can be derived in a
relatively straightforward manner. First, from (2) and (6) we can write

 Z
(r + s)(εe (y) − εe (yR )) = (r + s)(Ve (y) − Ve (yR )) = w(y) − yR + λe −

εe (y)


[1 − G(ε)]dε , (28)

εe (yR )

then from the distributional assumption on G(ε), (28) can be further simplified to

εe (y) − εe (yr ) =

w − yR + (ke (y(w)) − ke (yR ))µg
.
r+s

(29)

As a result, plugging (29) into (19), and substituting in the reduced-form estimates k̂e (wi ) and
k̂e (yR ), we can write the following:
yi = wi + α

wi − yR + (k̂e (wi ) − k̂e (yR ))µg
r+s

!
[r + s + k̂e (wi )],

(30)

for i ∈ {u, e} and where α = (1 − β )/β . We refer to the inefficient wage splitting rule as defined
by (30) as Specification I.
Given the difference in εe (y) and εe (yR ), we are able to discuss identifying the wage distribution. Following Flinn & Heckman (1982), we assume a log-normal distribution for wages, or
(

 )
∂ y(wi )
1
1 lny(wi ) − µ f 2
√ exp −
fw (wi ) =
/ (1 − F(yR ) ,
∂ wi y(wi )σ f 2π
2
σf
for i ∈ {u, e}.
Although we do not provide a proof of identification for κ1 , κ2 , α, µg , µ f , and σ f , we have
run Monte Carlo experiments to test our optimization procedure. We find 1500 observations is
sufficient in providing reliable estimates for the aforementioned parameters. In other words, we
simulate data from the model, plug the data into likelihood function, and estimate the parameters.
The results show the parameters used to generate the data are identified with the likelihood function
even though the function can have all the standard issues when maximizing a function of many
variables.
By imposing identifying restrictions, the parameters λu , λe , x, b, γ, r, along with the parameters
of the matching function can be deduced conditional on the estimates from the likelihood function.
Specifically, since we assume a time period of one quarter, we fix r = 0.01, consistent with a risk-
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free interest rate of 4% per annum. We also assume b = x and the Hosios condition (β = η), where
η is defined by the Cobb-Douglas matching function m(u, v) = Auη v1−η .12
Given α from the maximization of the likelihood function, β follows directly from α = (1 −
β )/β , which determines η, given the Hosios condition. In determining the remaining parameters
of the matching function, we follow Engelhardt et al. (2008) and recognize θ can be normalized to
one, given γ remains free to be used to equate the free entry of firms, and θ q(θ ) has been identified.
Hence, we set θ = 1 and deduce A = hu /(1 − F(yR )) as estimated in the likelihood function.
To obtain the arrival rates of outside opportunities, λu and λe , we use the fact λu /λe = k(e)(yR )/ku
as Ve (yR ) = Vu .13 Therefore, λu = λe κ1 expκ2 min(we ) /ku and λe is set so the equilibrium exit rate
of the median wage equals the reduced-form estimate found from maximizing the likelihood function.14
Finally, we plug the known parameters into the reservation wage equation, Ve (yR ) = Vu , to
deduce b, and use the free-entry condition
y − w(y)
f (y)dy.
yR r + s + λe (1 − G(εe (y)))

Z

γ = q(θ )
to deduce γ.

5.4

Estimation of the efficient contract

Estimation of the efficient contract follows the estimation of the fixed wage contract. The
likelihood function in (27) remains unchanged except that now wi = yi . This is accomplished by
constraining α = 0. As a result, the efficient contract is nested within the inefficient contract.
Results from the estimation of the efficient contract are denoted as Specification E.
Our ability to nest the likelihood functions and thus perform a formal specification test depends
on our reduced-form approach to estimating ke (y). Under this assumption, the exit rate is given by
κ1 exp(κ2 w) for both contracts; however, calculating ke (y) from the model’s equilibrium conditions
would result in different functions, εe (y), and thus the likelihood functions would not be nested.
12 As an alternative to assuming b = x, we could take the number of outside opportunities as a fixed number per
quarter, for example λu = λe = 1. Also, the Hosios condition can be relaxed if a CRS matching function is assumed
or JOLTS data is incorporated as discussed by Engelhardt & Rupert (2009).
13 As discussed above, if λ and λ were assumed to be a constant, then b and x could be deduced by plugging ε
e
u
u
into (22) and the reservation wage equation, Ve (yR ) = Vu .
14 It could be of interest to estimate λ (y). However, we take a more conventional approach and assume one exit
e
rate.
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This can be seen from equation (23). While the reduced-form approach does represent a simplification, it does not appear to affect the results. In Figure 4, the left of the two plots compares
the reduced-form estimates of ke (y) against those implied in the model (for the parameters estimated under Specification I). From this figure it can be seen that the reduced-form approximates
the more complicated function arising from the model. In addition to providing the means for a
formal specification test, the reduced-form approach also significantly reduces the computational
burden of the estimation procedure.

5.5

Model comparison

We have developed and estimated two models of the U.S. labor market. The analysis now
focuses on evaluating how well each model explains the observed outcomes. The comparison
is strengthened by the fact that the efficient contract is nested within the inefficient contract. If
α = 0, then the likelihood functions of the two models coincide; therefore, if the constraint α = 0
is rejected in favor of α 6= 0, then we have evidence in favor of the inefficient contract.
Before going further, we stress the comparison is made by examining the fit of each models’
predicted wage distribution to the observed wage distribution. While in theory it would be interesting to incorporate additional types of data including any up-front fees charged to the employee, the
cost of forgone wages due to a probationary period, or penalties from quitting such as the loss of a
retirement plan, it remains practically impossible as these variables are difficult to measure. Moreover, the inclusion of the hiring fee can have many alternative interpretations; it remains equivalent
to a “quitting” fee, or could be interpreted as capturing some wage-tenure features of employment
contracts, such as increasing wages. Therefore, one of the key contributions of this paper is to
be able to deduce the type of contract with a limited amount of information. In other words, the
important question is not whether we observe a hiring fee (or a “quitting” fee, etc.). Rather, what
matters is whether the observed wages, durations, and transitions remain consistent with agents
internalizing the negative externality. From (12) we know for any observed wage what the corresponding exit rate should be (or the corresponding duration). If observed wages, transitions, and
durations are consistent with the efficient exit rates, then we would fail to reject the hypothesis
that α = 0. Therefore, we do not need to observe the specific employment contract to make this
comparison.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Specification
Parameter
s

E
0.128
(0.121, 0.135)
δ
0.437
(0.413, 0.463)
ku
0.244
(0.215, 0.275)
κ1
0.309
(0.283, 0.337)
κ2
-0.035
(-0.044, -0.026)
hu /(1 − F(yR ))
1.029
(0.953, 1.125)
µf
2.061
(2.046, 2.076)
σf
0.406
(0.391, 0.42)
(1 − β )/β
–

I
0.127
(0.121, 0.134)
0.438
(0.415, 0.463)
0.243
(0.214, 0.277)
0.35
(0.329, 0.365)
-0.048
(-0.052, -0.043)
1.049
(0.967, 1.136)
2.362
(2.237, 2.504)
0.657
(0.612, 0.701)
3.078
(2.282, 4.163)
µg
–
71.123
(65.707, 82.645)
lnL
-20,701.546
-20,637.029
LR test
129.034
p value
6.66x10−30
Note: Arrival rates are quarterly. In the brackets
are the 5% and 95% percentiles from bootstrapping with 500 draws.

Table 2 presents the results from the estimation of the two likelihood functions under their
respective specifications. In general, we find the unemployed exit the labor force at one-quarter
the rate they enter employment. Also, those in the lower quartile of the wage distribution exit
employment for non-participation 20% faster than those in the upper quartile. Note the transition
rates remain relatively high compared to other studies; however, our sample consists of young
individuals who experience higher transition rates. In particular, the exit rate δ states the average
amount of time spent outside the labor force is 2.28 quarters. To some, this may seem high.
However, the average duration outside the labor force (to ) is 2.5 quarters (the estimate of δ is
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slightly different due to stock sampling and right censoring). Figure 2 provides a closer look at to .
For our analysis, α represents the key parameter estimate. Recall, in our formulation of the
likelihood function, the value of the likelihood function under inefficient contract must be greater
than the value of the likelihood function of the efficient contract. This occurs because the likelihood
functions only differ in terms of the wage distributions, and the wage distributions remain identical
if α = 0; therefore the likelihood function of the efficient contract is nested in the likelihood
function of the inefficient contract. This connection between the two likelihood functions allows
for a clear comparison based on the fit of the wage distribution, and more specifically allows for
a formal specification test (a likelihood ratio test). Regarding the fit, the likelihood ratio test,
presented at the bottom of Table 2, rejects the efficient contract in favor of the inefficient contract.
Thus, we are able to conclude that observed wages, transitions, and durations are not consistent
with the predictions of the efficient contract, and instead remain more consistent with the inefficient
contract.
Alternatively, it could be argued the market is efficient and the basic search model is misspecified. For instance, the incorporation of on-the-job search would change the wage contract
and imply the estimation is misspecified. In terms of on-the-job search, we do observe job-to-job
transitions which the current model does not capture. On the other hand, including it would not
eliminate the negative externality discussed above. Actually, the similarities between the decision
to exit employment for non-participation or another job is similar. In leaving the current job for a
new and more productive job, agents still impose a negative externality on their current firm. Thus,
while on-the-job search (and other extensions) represent critical additions to the understanding of
whether the labor market is efficient, we believe our analysis highlights why such a discussion is
important.
To further examine the results of the statistical test, we plot the key difference in Figure 3. This
figure compares the two wage distributions (wages offered at the time of hire (wu ) and employed
wage distribution (we )) observed in the data against the predicted distributions. Although the
distinctions are subtle in the figure, the inefficient contract appears to fit the distribution better
than the efficient contract. In particular, the inefficient contract has a larger mass of individuals
at the lower end of the distribution, matching a noticeable feature of the observed distribution.
Analytically, this arises from the second term in (30). If the term was constant or a linear function
of w, then the inefficient and efficient distributions would be hard to differentiate as the location
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and scale parameters of the productivity distribution would compensate this difference. Therefore,
the key is the way in which the last term of (30) changes. In particular, the term grows with y,
implying the proportion of the surplus going to workers shrinks as y grows. This occurs because
the rates of exit, ke (y), fall as output, y, and wages, w, grow. As a result, the inefficient contract
produces a larger weight at the lower end of the distribution. Intuitively, the agents are losing their
ability to bargain as productivity increases because their outside option is becoming less appealing.
Therefore, the inefficient contract predicts that the wage rises as productivity rises, but at a slower
rate. Given this, the inefficient contract has less dispersion relative to the efficient contract, in
addition to predicting the larger mass of individuals in the lower end of the distribution.
Figure 3: Offered and Employed Hourly Wage Distributions

Given the employment contract featuring only a fixed wage best describes the data, we explore
the differences in welfare between the fixed wage contract and the efficient contract. To demonstrate the differences, we use the parameters from Specification I (discussion of the identification
of the estimates is provided in Section 5.3). Table 3 presents the list of the parameters and their
values.

6

Welfare & efficiency
Based on the analysis thus far, we have concluded that the fixed employment contract represents

the more appropriate model for capturing the observed labor market equilibrium. To quantitatively
assess the implications of this, we investigate the available welfare gains of moving to the efficient
24

Table 3: Parameters
r
b
x
A
η
β
γ
s
µf
σf
µg
λu
λe
δ

0.01
0.002
0.002
1.049
0.245
0.245
21.442
0.127
2.362
0.657
71.122
0.475
0.591
0.438

discount rate
unemployed utility flow
outside the labor force utility flow
efficiency of matching function
elasticity of matching function
bargaining power of workers
recruiting cost
job destruction rate
mean of log normal distribution of job productivity
s.d. of log normal distribution of job productivity
mean of exponential distribution of outside options
unemployed flow of outside options
employed flow of outside options
non-participant separation rate

equilibrium. To accomplish this, we perform the following counterfactual exercise. We take the
parameters estimated for the fixed wage contract, and calculate the equilibrium of the model using
the efficient contract. From these calculations, we compare how the levels of unemployment,
employment, labor force participation, and ultimately welfare would change if the market moved
from the inefficient contract to the efficient one.
To perform the counterfactual exercise, we use the following welfare function
Z

W = nu (b + λu

εdG(ε) − θ γ) +

εu

Z 
yR


Z
ne (y) y + λe

εe (y)


εdG(ε) dy + no x.

(31)

From Equation 31, welfare equals the sum of unemployed workers’ consumption (b), the average
output (y) produced in each match, the utility flow of those of non-participants (x), and the utility
from taking the outside option and exiting the labor force, minus the recruiting expenses incurred
by firms to find unemployed workers (γ).15
Table 4 presents the increase in welfare and the change in labor market outcomes, given a
structural shift from a fixed wage contract to the efficient contract. From Table 4, labor force
participation would rise by 9%, unemployment would decrease by 10%, and employment would
increase by 17%. When employed agents internalize the negative externality imposed by their
15 The

number of vacancies in equilibrium is equal to the product of market tightness, θ , and the measure of unemployed workers, nu .
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Table 4: Labor Market Outcomes from Shift in Contract
Estimated Counterfactual
Contract
Contract
Percentage
Parameters (Inefficient)
(Efficient)
change
Not in Labor Force (%)
36.4
30.5
-16.21
Unemployed (%)
17.4
15.5
-10.92
Employed (%)
46.2
54
16.88
Welfare
23.2
24.07
3.75

decisions to quit, they exit at a slower rate than in the fixed wage contract. As a result, labor force
participation rises. Also, the number of vacancies opened by firms increases as matches become
longer and more valuable. Therefore, we observe a lower unemployment rate as well. Overall, we
see a shift to the efficient contract would result in an increase in welfare of 3.75%.
The rate employed agents exit the labor force represents a key component of the model. It
also represents the primary difference between the efficient employment contract and the contract
featuring only a fixed wage. The rate at which an agent exits the labor force from employment is
given by λe [1 − G(εe (w(y)))]. One prediction of this model is whether exit rates from employment
to non-participation vary across the distribution of wages. Since εe (w(y)) increases with the wage,
depending on the distribution of G(ε), employed agents in the upper-end of the wage distribution
may exit at a slower rate than those in the lower end of the distribution. Indeed, we observe different
exit rates over the wage distribution. Figure 4 provides the reduced-form exit rates given by the
likelihood function. They are plotted by wages and output. In addition, it displays the rate workers
exit under each contract assuming Specification I and the parameter estimates it implies are correct.
Thus, the efficient contract estimates that are displayed in the figure are the counterfactual results
found when running the model with the parameter estimates from Specification I.
Figure 4 is important for two reasons. First, it provides support that the exit rates from employment to non-participation decline as wages rise. In other words, it supports the idea that workers
are influenced by their wage when choosing to exit. Second, internalizing the cost of exiting represents the key to improving welfare. If one looks at the exit rates by the output of a job, then the
efficient contract implies a much smaller exit rate as workers internalize the full cost of exiting.
However, it might be surprising that workers exit at a slightly faster rate under the efficient contract when looking at it by the wage. The reason is in the inefficient contract, the wage does not
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coincide with the output of a job as it does in the case of the efficient contract. Moreover, in the
inefficient contract, the wage moves further from output as the output of a job increases. Examining exit rates at a wage of $15.00 for example, is the same as output of 15 in the efficient contract,
while it corresponds to output of much more that 15 in the inefficient contract. Thus, that the exit
rates for the efficient contract eventually lie above those for the inefficient contract when plotted
by wages highlights both the nature of the inefficiency in wages, and that this inefficiency grows
as the output of the job increases.
Figure 4: Employed Exit Rate by Output and Wage

7

Conclusion
We develop an equilibrium search model capable of accounting for observed transitions in and

out of the labor market. When agents receive idiosyncratic shocks affecting the value of nonmarket activity, an employment contract consisting of only a fixed wage remains inefficient. In
the efficient employment contract, agents receive a wage equal to the productivity of the match,
and pay a hiring fee upon its formation. The analysis in this paper highlights the difficulties facing researchers attempting to study labor market outcomes, wage contracts, and the implications
of various policies on these outcomes. Based on our conclusions, the efficient employment contract does not appear to be consistent with the data, suggesting a role for labor market policies,
specifically those aimed at reducing the flow of agents from employment to inactivity.
In this paper we do not discuss potential policies that could provide a structural shift from
the observed equilibrium to one more closely resembling the efficient contract. These alternatives
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provide an interesting direction for future research. For example, a tax and transfer scheme could
be designed in a manner that produces wage contracts similar to the efficient contract. In addition,
future research should also focus on determining what factors may be preventing the efficient
outcome from occurring.

A

Appendix. Proof of Lemma 1

Proof of Lemma 1

According to Nash’s axioms, (φ , w) must be pairwise Pareto-efficient. Since

the up-front payment φ allows the worker and the firm to transfer utility perfectly, the wage, w,
must be chosen to maximize the total surplus of the match. The comparison of (6) and (12) shows
that the match surplus is maximized iff V f = 0. From (9), V f = 0 requires w = y. Finally, the
first-order condition of (13) with respect to φ yields (15).
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